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11 Introduction
Thanks to the decreased costs of transportation and communication, the world became
a densely connected network. This is particularly true for markets and natural resources.
International trade connects world markets to the extent that the world prices are determined
by the demand and supply conditions of countries that take part in it. How and how much
a country aects the market depend both on the size and the position of the country in the
network.
One example is the market for crude oil. The price is determined by many factors from
dierent regions of the world. As the petrol is relatively easy to transport, we observe
a single global price which does not change much from region to region. Any dierence
between regional prices would be oset through trade. Market power of an oil exporting
country is determined by the capacity and eciency of its production. The Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries use their combined market share to inuence the price of
oil.
The market for natural gas presents a much more complex example. It requires an
infrastructure to be carried to consumers. It is carried mainly through pipelines1. Other
forms of transportation are not economical when compared with pipelines. Which countries
can trade natural gas is determined by the structure of the network formed by the natural
gas pipelines. This leads to the formation of regional prices. The price for a thousand
cubic meters of natural gas ranges almost from zero to 300 (EU Commission Sta Working
Document (2006)), depending on the location. An importing country with a single supplier
faces a monopoly and pays a higher price. An importing country which has alternative
suppliers will pay a lower price thanks to the competition between the latter. The market
power of exporting countries are determined both by their production and their position in
the market. The recent attempt of natural gas exporting countries to mimic OPEC will
potentially create a cartel which can decide both the quantity and the destination of supply.
Moreover, the transit countries which transport the gas from producers to consumers become
strategic actors, independent of whether they produce natural gas or not.
To understand how the market for the natural gas functions we need to go into the details
1More than 90 percent of the natural gas imports of the European Union are through pipelines (EU
Commission Sta Working Document (2006)). The ratio for global gas imports is around 80 percent (Victor
et. al. 2006). The three countries which depend most on maritime transportation of natural gas are Japan,
Taiwan and South Korea. It is due to the infeasibility of building long distance pipelines in the ocean.
2of the network that connects suppliers with consumers. A structural analysis is required
to understand the patterns of interaction and to quantify the inuence that countries or
regions have on each other. We need to understand how each link aects the countries that
it connects and measure how much it changes the prices. We can ask how the addition of a
new link changes the market and whether it would be protable to construct it. Then we
can see how a country (e.g. Russia) or a group of countries (e.g. the European Union) can
improve their market power by coordinating their policies on infrastructure and consumption.
We model a bipartite network, where links connect rms with markets. We look at the
Cournot game, where rms decide how much to sell at each market they are connected to.
We assume that rms have convex quadratic costs and markets have linear inverse demand
functions.
We show that there exists a unique the Cournot equilibrium. We write the equilibrium
conditions as a linear complementarity problem and provide an interpretation of the equilib-
rium ows using the Katz-Bonacich centrality (Katz 1953, Bonacich 1987). We then study
the eects of a cartel and the strategic complementarities between links.
We bridge two branches of the literature. On one side we study Cournot competition.
We extend the basic to a network of rms and markets. Given a network, we show how the
structure of connections determines rms' supply levels.
The closest line of literature is the analysis of behavior on networks. Ballester et al.
(2006) analyzes the equilibrium activities at each node of a simple (i.e. not bipartite) non-
directed network. Players create externalities on their neighbors. A player has a single
level of activity. Her payo depends on her activity level and of her neighbors'. They show
that the equilibrium levels are given by a network centrality index, which is similar to the
Katz-Bonacich centrality. Ballester and Calv o-Armengol (2006) shows that the rst order
equilibrium conditions of games which exhibit cross inuences between agents' actions are
linear complementarity problems. They study some interesting classes of such games which
have a unique equilibrium. In both of these papers, the agents' strategy spaces are subsets
of the real line. A link between two agents shows that they impose externalities on each
other. In our model, agents' strategy spaces are multidimensional and a link is not only a
qualitative object, but also carries a value which is determined endogenously.
As in Corominas-Bosch (2004) we study a bipartite network. She studies the equilibria
of a bargaining game in a network of buyers and sellers. Her model diers from ours in two
basic points. First, both buyers and sellers are active agents, where we model only the rms
3as strategic. Second, in Corominas-Bosch (2004) buyers and sellers are bargaining over a
single indivisible good. In contrast we assume that the good transferred through the links
is perfectly divisible, allowing a rm to supply to many markets.
The basic notation, some of which we borrow from Corominas-Bosch (2004), is introduced
in Section 2. Section 3 denes the payos. We dene the Cournot game in Section 4 and solve
for its equilibrium. In Section 5 we demonstrate some applications of the model. Section 6
concludes. The proofs are given in the Appendix.
2 Notation
There are n markets v1;:::;vn; and m rms f1;:::;fm: They are embedded in a network that
links markets with rms, and rms can supply to the markets they are connected to. We
will represent the network as a graph.
A non-directed bipartite graph g = hV [ F;Li consists of a set of nodes formed by markets
V = fv1;:::;vng, and rms F = ff1;:::;fmg and a set of links L; each link joining a market
with a rm. A link from vi to fj will be denoted as (i;j). We say that a market vi is
linked to a rm fj if there is a link joining the two. We will use (i;j) 2 g and (i;j) 2 L
interchangeably, meaning that vi and fj are connected in g. Let r(g) be the number of links
in g.
A graph g is connected if there exists a path linking any two nodes of the graph. For-
mally, a path linking nodes vi and fj will be a collection of t rms and t markets, t  0;
v1;:::vt;f1;:::;ft among V [ F (possibly some of them repeated) such that
f(i;1);(1;1);(1;2);:::;(t;t);(t;j)g 2 g
A subgraph g0 = hV0 [ F0;L0i of g is a graph such that V0  V;F0  F;L0  L and such
that each link in L that connects a market in V0 with a rm in F0 is a member of L0: Hence
a node of g0 will continue to have the same links it had with the other nodes in g0. We will
write g0  g to mean that g0 is a subgraph of g: For a subgraph g0 of g, we will denote by
g   g0, the subgraph of g that results when we remove the set of nodes V0 [ F0 from g.
Given a subgraph g0 = hV0 [ F0;L0i of g, let   ! g0 be the complete bipartite graph with
nodes V0 [ F0: We call   ! g0 the completed graph of g0.
Ng(vi) will denote the set of rms linked with vi in g = hV [ F;Li; more formally:
4Ng(vi) = ffj 2 F such that (i;j) 2 gg
and similarly Ng(fj) stands for the set of markets linked with fj:
For a set A; let jAj denote the number of elements in A. For vi in S, we denote jNg(vi)j
by mi(g): Similarly for fj 2 F; let jNg(fj)j = nj(g); be the number of markets connected to
fj:
Labeling of pairs (i,j) We will rst order all possible links such that the links of a
rm j are assigned a lower number than any rm i for i > j, and the links of a rm are
ordered according to the indices of the markets they connect. The label of a possible link
(i;j) will be denoted by (i;j). For example for 2 rms and 2 markets, we will order the
links starting from rm f1 and market m1, (1;1) = 1: The second link is between f1 and
m2, (2;1) = 2: Now, as all links of rm f1 are ranked,  will next rank the link between f2
and m1; (1;2) = 3: Then comes the link between rm f2 and market m2, (2;2) = 4:
For a network g, let Y (g) = fy 2 N+ : y = (i;j) for some (i;j) = 2 gg be the set of
indices that  assigns to links which are not in g. Assume, without loss of generality that
jY (g)j = m  n   r(g); for some 1  r(g)  m  n, where r(g) is the number of links in
graph g. For 2 rms and 2 markets, for a graph g; if the only missing link is (1;2), then
Y (g) = f3g and r(g) = 3:
 orders all possible links, independent of g, where as Y (g) does depend on g. We can
see how this works on an example. Suppose that 2 cities and 2 sources, form a completely
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Although link (1;2) does not exist in g2 it is still labeled equally by . (1;2) = 3,
meaning that Y (g2) = f3g.
We will make use of graphs g1 and g2 in many examples throughout the paper.
Now we dene the column vector that shows the quantities owing at each link. Let
Q = [ez] be the column vector of quantities extracted such that for qij, the quantity extracted












Let Q j be the vector obtained by deleting row j from Q: For J  N+, let Q J be the
vector obtained deleting each row j 2 J and column j 2 J from Q: For Y (g)  N; let Qg be
the matrix obtained by deleting each row y 2 Y (g) from Q: Then Qg has size r: Qg is the






















For j 2 N+, let Qg j be the vector obtained from Qg by deleting row j. For J  N+,
letQg J be the vector obtained from Qg by deleting each row j 2 J.
Let Q(mn) be the set of all non-negative real valued column vectors of size (mn): Let
Qrbe the set of all non-negative real valued column vectors of size r:
6Given a vector of ows Qg, for a rm fj; we will denote by Sj(Qg) the total production
by fj. For a market vi we will denote by Di(Qg) the total demand at vi.
3 Demand and Cost Functions
We assume that markets have linear inverse demand functions. Given a market vi and a ow
vector Qg the price at vi is
pi(Qg) = i   iDi(Qg)
where i;i > 0.







where j > 0












Marginal prot is not separable with respect to each market. The marginal prot from qij
does depend on the supply from fj to markets other than vi:
4 The Cournot Game
Given a network g; each rm fj maximizes its prot by supplying a non-negative amount to
the markets in Ng(fj): So, the set of players are the set of rms F. The set of strategies of
a rm fj is Qj = QNg(fj). We denote a representative strategy of fj by Qj 2 Qj. Given that




The best response Q0
j of rm fj to Qg 2 Qg is such that,



















7The rst order equilibrium conditions of the Cournot game constitutes a linear comple-
mentarity problem. Given a matrix M 2 Rtt and a vector p 2 Rt, the linear complemen-
tarity problem LCP(p;M) consists of nding a vector z 2 Rt satisfying:
z  0; (1)
p + Mz  0; (2)
z
T(p + Mz)  0 (3)
Samelson et al: (1958) shows that a linear complementarity problem LCP(p;M) has
a unique solution for all p 2 Rt if and only if all the principal minors of M are positive.
We prove this to be true for the linear complementarity problem formed by the rst order
equilibrium conditions of the Cournot game.
We further check for the second order conditions for each agent, which reveals that the
solution of the linear complementarity problem is indeed the equilibrium of the game.
Theorem 1 The Cournot game has a unique Nash equilibrium.
Example Suppose we have the graph g1: Let  =  =  = 1: Then the link supplies




22 = 0:2: The prices and the prots are p1 = p2 = 0:6
and 1 = 2 = 0:16, respectively.
Suppose the graph was g2: Now at equilibrium, q
11 = 0:2857, q
21 = 0:1429, and q
22 =
0:2857: The deletion of the link (1;2) changes the supply to market v2, and moreover rm f1
supplies less to the market she shares with rm f2. The prices and the prots are p1 = 0:7125,
p2 = 0:5696 and 1 = 0:1936, 2 = 0:1224, respectively.
Let Q
g be an equilibrium of the Cournot game. There might be some links in g which
carry zero ow at equilibrium Q















To calculate the equilibrium quantities, rst we need to weed out the links with zero ow.
Let  : L ! N+ be a lexicographic order on L respecting  such that  relabels the (i;j)
8pairs from 1 to r(g) by skipping those links which are not in g.2 Now we delete from Q
g, the






= fz 2 N+ : z = (i;j) for some (i;j) s.t. q





  = t; then
Q
g Z(Q
g) is a vector of size r(g) t obtained from Q
g by deleting the zero entries. It is the
vector of equilibrium quantities for links over which there is a strictly positive ow from a
rm to a market.
Let Q
g be the equilibrium of the Cournot game at network g. We denote by g   Z(Q
g)
the network obtained from g by deleting the links which have zero ow at Q
g.
Theorem 2 Given two networks g and g0. Let Q
g and Q
g0 be the equilibrium of the Cournot
game in g and g0, respectively. If g   Z(Q






At equilibrium there might be links which carry no ows. For the rms of such links, the
marginal prots of supplying via them are not positive. They are indierent between having
such a link or not. Theorem 2 tells us such links with zero ow play no role in determining


























2Explicitly,  : L ! N+ is such that:
(i) 9(i;j) 2 L such that (i;j) = 1;
(ii) (i;j) 6= (k;l) ) (i;j) 6= (k;l);
(iii) j < l ) (i;j) < (k;l) for all (i;j);(k;l) 2 L;
(iv) i < k ) (i;j) < (k;j) for all (i;j);(k;j) 2 L;
(v) if 9(i;j) s.t. (i;j) = z > 1 then 9(k;l) 2 L s.t. (k;l) = y   1:






























4. At the equilibrium in g3, the marginal prot to rm f3 from supplying
via (1;3) was negative. Deleting it does not change the equilibrium quantities on other links,
because the marginal prots from them are the same as in graph g3.
We will use the marginal prot argument employed in this example to give a network
interpretation for the quantities at equilibrium Q
g Z(Q
g) on any given graph g.
Denition 1 Given a graph g, a line graph I(g) of g is a graph obtained by denoting each
link in g with a node in I(g) and connecting two nodes in I(g) if and only if the corresponding
links in g meet at one endpoint.
Given a network g, let r(g) = r(g) t. Let G = [gij]r(g)r(g) be the weighted adjacency






l; if  1(i) and  1(j) share rm fl
l; if  1(i) and  1(j) share market vl
0; otherwise













For any graph g, G has diagonal entries as 0 and non-diagonal entries are either 0; or
: We will use G to denote both the line graph of g   Z(Q
g) and the weighted adjacency





2i+j; if k = l and  1(k) = (i;j)
0; otherwise
For a  0, and a network adjacency matrix G, let
M(G








If M(a;G) is non-negative, its entries mij(G;a) counts the number of paths in the
network, starting at node i and ending at node j, where paths of length k are weighted by
ak.
Denition 2 For a network adjacency matrix G, and for scalar a > 0 such that M(G;a) =
[I   aG]
 1 is well-dened and non-negative, the vector Katz-Bonacich centralities of param-
eter a in G is:
b(G;a) = [I   aG]
 1 :1





counts the total number of paths in G starting from i:



















where  is a column vector such that for t = (i;j), t = i.
The rst summation counts the total number of even paths that start from the corre-
sponding node in G; and the second summation counts the total number of odd paths that
start from it:
The rst sum tells that the equilibrium ows from a link is positively related with the
number of even length paths that start from it. The links which have an even distance
11between them are complements. In contrast, the negative sign on the second summation
means the equilibrium supply from a link is negatively related with the number of odd
length paths that start from it. The links which have an odd distance between them are
substitutes.
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Figure 5
links (1;1) and (2;2) are complements. The supply to market v2 by rm f2 increases incen-
tives for rm f1 to supply more to market v1, because the former decreases the marginal
revenue on v2. This makes v1 a better option. Links (1;1) and (2;1) are substitutes, be-
cause supply through one decreases the marginal revenue to rm f1. This decreases rm's
incentives to supply more.
In general, the links of a rm are substitutes for each other (e.g. (1;1) and (2;2) at
graph g1). Similarly, the links of a market are substitutes for each other, too (e.g. (1;1) and
(1;2) at graph g1). If two rms are sharing a market, then their links to markets they don't
share are complements (e.g. (1;1) and (2;2) at graph g1). Moreover, if a link (i1;j1) is a
substitute of a link (i2;j2) and (i2;j2) is a substitute of (i3;j3), then (i1;j1) and (i3;j3) are
complements. Therefore, the eect depends on the parity of the distance between two links.
In the Cournot game the adjacency matrix G does not necessarily have binary entries,
neither its non-zero entries are all equal. Each link in G has a weight. While counting the
number of paths, these weights are taken into account as well. The total supply a rm fj is
calculated by summing up the link centralities of the elements in Ng(fj).
5 Applications
5.1 Cartel
Let there be 2 markets and 5 rms connected as in the graph g5 below.
12t t
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Figure 6
Let  =  =  = 1. Then the equilibrium quantities, prices and prots are



































The collusion beneted rms
Formation of a cartel in a standard market would benet all producers which are not
in the cartel and hurt all consumers. In a networked market the eects are not symmetric.
The markets which are linked to more than one member of the cartel are worse o. Those
producers whose production can substitute the cartel's supply reduction improve. The mar-
kets which are linked with a single member of the cartel are better o, while the producers
of those markets are worse o. The eects of the cartel would diuse through the network
aecting all consumers and producers.
5.2 Strategic Complementarities
Let there be 2 markets and 4 rms connected as in the graph g5 below.
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Figure 7











Suppose rm 3 commits to supply zero to market 1. Now, the equilibrium quantities,





















The commitment to zero supply increased the prots of rms 1,2 and 3, but hurt rm 4.
The consumers in market 1 are worse o, but the consumers in market 2 are better o.
This is the type of strategic complementarities analyzed in Bulow et al. (1985). The
model they studied had two markets, while our model shows that their results carry through
in a setup with multiple markets and rms.
6 Conclusion
We have analyzed a situation where rms embedded in a network with markets compete a
la Cournot. We have shown that the equilibrium ows will depend on the whole structure.
The quantity supplied by a rm to a market depends on the centrality of the links it has.
The centrality index which determines the quantities is calculated using the line graph of
the positive ow network. The quantity owing through a link is positively proportional
with the number of even paths and negatively proportional with the number of odd paths
starting from it.
14The network ows studied in graph theory and operations research literature3 do not
parallel the economic model studied in this paper. The analyzes of strategic behavior requires
the introduction of decision making nodes to the model of ow networks. This distinguishes
our approach from the existing literature on ow networks.
Although the network in our model is xed, the analysis paves way for further research
on strategic network formation in competitive markets. The results we provide can be used
to calculate the benet of each potential link to a rm. Once players know the payo they
would obtain in each network, they could manipulate their connections to maximize their
prots.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1 Given a graph g, at any the equilibrium of the Cournot game the
ows cannot be negative
Q

g  0 (4)
For each link (i;j) 2 g, at equilibrium
@j
@qijjq

















These set of equations can be written in matrix form
  + DgQ

g  0 (5)
where  = [t]r such that for t = (i;j), t = i and Dg = [dtz]rr such that
dtz =
8
> > > <
> > > :
2i + j; if t = z = (i;j) for some vi 2 V;fj 2 F
j , if t 6= z;t = (i;j);z = (k;j) for some vi;vk 2 V;fj 2 F
i , if t 6= z;t = (i;j);z = (i;k) for some vi 2 V;fj;fk 2 F
0 , otherwise










g)  0 (6)
The rst order equilibrium conditions (4);(5);(6) of the Cournot game constitute a
LCP( ;Dg).
16Samelson et al: (1958) shows that a linear complementarity problem LCP(p;M) has a
unique solution for all p 2 Rt if and only if all the principal minors of M are positive. Positive
denite matrices satisfy this condition and we will now that Dg
4 is positive denite for any
graph g.
We show that for any matrix Dg we can nd a matrix R with independent columns such
that Dg = RTR: 5






2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2
1 0 21 + 2 2








6 6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6 6
4
p
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5
Then clearly Dg1 = RTR. Given a graph g, the same technique can be used to show that
Dg is positive denite. Hence, for any g and any , LCP( ;Dg) has a unique solution.
Now, let's check that the second order conditions are satised. For rm fk with n
connections we rst label the connections from 1 to n. Hence, Ng(fk) = fv1;:::;vng. Then
the Hessian of the prot function k is H = [hij]nn where
4The interpretation, when we use it to nd the equilibrium quantities owing from markets to rms, is
that the column z and the row z in Dg corresponds to the link (i;j) in g such that (i;j) = z. Hence,
column 1 and row 1 corresponds to the link (1;1), column 2 and row 2 corresponds to the link (2;1); column
3 and row 3 corresponds to the link (1;2), and column 4 and row 4 corresponds to the link (2;2):
5This is equivalent to checking that D is positive denite. For other characterizations of positive de-
niteness see Strang (1988).
17hij =
(
 2i   k; if i = j
 k; otherwise
Let H0 =  H. We can use the same technique applied for Dg to show that H0 is positive
denite. Hence, H is negative denite. The solution of LCP( ;Dg) is the equilibrium of
the Cournot game.
Proof of Theorem 2 Assume Q
g Z(Qg);Q
g Z(Q00






















As we showed in proposition 6 Dg Z(Q
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